The machine protection system of the LHC is designed to minimise the impact of beam losses and quenches. The question is discussed, whether these precautions are sufficient for the discussed upgrade scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
Machine protection consists of a complex of measures to prevent damage to the accelerator or destruction of components in case of malfunctions. As the survival of the accelerator depends on its machine protection system, these systems are usually based on a fail safe network connecting the various contributing subsystems.
The overall performance of a machine protection system depends therefore not only on the chosen network but very essentially on the installed subsystems and their performance. Some of these subsystems are discussed in their own right at this workshop separately. Hence this paper will be focussed on the overall performance of the machine protection system facing higher intensities and higher beam energies.
In protecting against damage and long repair times a machine protection system maximises inherently the beam-on time. On the other hand, it can force beam dumps accidentally. The overall machine condition, in particular beam losses, electrical noise, heat, can have an severe impact on the number of unnecessary beam dumps.
MACHINE PROTECTION OF THE LHC
The main sources of danger are the stored energy in the beam, the stored energy in the magnets and the energy coming from the mains. Consequently, the main subsystems are the magnet powering system, the beam dump including the septa and kickers, and the extraction system for the stored magnetic energy.
The main information sources, signalling the imminent danger are a well tuned and fast beam loss monitoring system, a system to detect overheating of normal conducting magnets and cables, as well as the equivalent for the superconducting magnets, links, and current leads. The latter is usually called "quench protection system" (a euphemism par excellence as it does not protect quenches nor does it protect against quenches). In addition the information that a vital subsystem stops to function properly is also routed to the network. Finally, all other subsystems that can have an influence on the beam or the stored magnetic energy as the RF, the cryogenics, the mains power (including the UPS), the vacuum valves, the injection elements etc. contribute to the machine protection. Also beam position measurements are sometimes used as a warning signal and may be included in a future extension of the LHC machine protection system, as it is done in other machines [1] . The LHC machine protection system was recently described in ref [2] . A more explicit description of the underlying network, as it was planned at that time, can be found in ref [3] .
The LHC has such intense beams that not only the experiments, but also the machine components have to be protected against the constant bombardment with lost particles and the subsequent showers. In fact, the LHC can never reach its design luminosity without an extremely and unprecedented efficient collimator system, as was pointed out by R. Assmann [4] in his talk at this workshop. In a sense the collimation system has become the first line of defence against beam losses, while the beam dump [5] serves as the last resort. This explains why we see the collimators and the beam dump system as the main issues, almost separated from the "trivial" rest of the machine protection. Consequently, the organizers of this workshop have split the whole machine protection complex in three parts: the collimators, the beam dump, and the rest. We will therefore, as far as this paper is concerned, assume that all collimator and beam dump issues are solved.
THE IMPACT OF AN INTENSITY UPGRADE
One of the steps towards a luminosity increase of the LHC consists of increasing the intensity [6] . The beam current would be raised from the design value of 0.56 A to 0.86 A or even 1.32 A. Strictly speaking, the machine protection is, under the above stated assumptions, almost not concerned. The beam loss monitoring system will have to protect against beam induced quenches by signalling significant losses early enough. In the worst case the magnets will quench and the machine protection system will dump the beam. This will of course reduce the beam-on time considerably. A quantitative estimate can not be given. The result depends entirely on the efficiency of the collimation system.
The machine protection system as such works also at increased beam intensities. There might be reliability issues for the electronics for protection of the warm magnets and a higher sensitivity to quenches of the superconducting links in the cleaning sections 3 and 7, however.
MACHINE PROTECTION FOR THE "ULTIMATE" LHC
The next step in LHC upgrade, mentioned in ref [6] , involves an energy upgrade to 7.54 TeV, corresponding to a magnetic field of 9 T in the MBs. In the reference [6] it is stated that this mode might be limited by either cryogenics or the beam dump system. As was pointed out by B. Goddard [5] , the beam dump will be able to cope with this small energy increase. The higher current density and the higher magnetic field have, however, an effect on the magnet stability. Figure 1 and figure 2 (courtesy S. Russenschuck) explain this. Figure 1 Load line of the LHC dipoles (Courtesy S.
Russenschuck)
The figure 1 shows the critical surface of the superconductor in the dipoles. Outside the "tent" the superconductivity is lost. The three axes are the field (B), the temperature (T) and the current density (J). A magnet works along its load line at a given temperature, say 1.9 K. The load line is in the plane, which is parallel to the J-B plane. The operating point is somewhere along the line, well below the "tent".
Temperature excursions don't move the working point along the load line, but in a plane parallel to the J-T plane. A temperature increase pushes the working point sideways towards the "tent", as shown in figure 2 . The distance between working point and critical surface along this sideways path is In figure 3 [7] plotted as a function of the magnetic field. The following The reduction of absorbable beam loss corresponds to a decrease of the number of secondaries by a factor of 2.5 and a decrease of primary lost protons by a factor of 2.7. Unless this improvement can be guaranteed by the collimation system, the time lost with quench recovery will increase dramatically.
MACHINE PROTECTION OF A 14 TEV UPGRADED LHC
This scenario is based on immature technologies. Hence a detailed assessment is not possible. However, most components of the machine protection system, as the beam loss detection system and the quench detection system, may remain unchanged. Of course, collimation and beam dump are different issues.
The most striking differences are the increase in stored energy in the beam and in the magnets.
The size of the tunnel gives an upper limit on the magnet size of 16.6 T magnets (14 TeV). The coil volume has to stay practically constant. It follows that the stored magnetic energy will go up with the square of the magnetic field by a factor 4 or slightly more. 2 
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I L E = One can achieve this by increasing the inductance (number of windings) by a factor 4 or by increasing the current by a factor 2 or a suitable combination. Note that the magnets will still be in series and hence every magnet has to be able to absorb its own stored energy and to bypass the energy of the rest of the system between the neighbouring energy extraction resistors. This sets the requirements for the quench heaters and/or the maximum length of the magnets.
We calculate the maximum voltage at the beginning of an energy extraction to be
The maximum voltage U is most likely not far different from the present 1 kV.
Assuming a constant inductance, the current I has to go up by 2 and the dump resistance has to decrease by 2 to meet the voltage requirement. Hence, one needs in the present scheme cold diodes of 26 kA with 4 times bigger heatsinks (i.e. 240 kg). Our present experience with industry shows that industry will be reluctant to develop a cold diode suitable for 26 kA. Even 13 kA diodes might be difficult to procure. And 240 kg heatsinks are not easy to exchange in the tunnel.
Of course, one could adopt the emergency current leads (HTS?) of the Tevatron with warm diodes. Still, the energy extraction would be difficult to accommodate in the tunnel with warm switches, twice the size of the present design, and resistors four times bigger, to absorb the energy. Maybe new current HTS leads with integrated switches would fit into the tunnel.
It would be healthier to keep the maximum current and the current decay time constant by subdividing the sector not in two but in eight pieces. One would need more current leads, obviously. To accommodate the switches in the tunnel, the switches have to be part of the current leads or additional short straight sections will be needed. The energy per resistor would even be lower than presently and diodes, as are used today, could serve as bypass. Alternative powering schemes may be possible as well, but are likely to meet difficulties as well due to space limitations.
The case is less severe for the quadrupole circuits. However, a compatible design for the final focus and its protection has still to be found.
SUMMARY
The performance of the machine protection system relies on many systems and has yet to be proven. Assuming that the network part and the logic work as designed, there is little reason, why it should not work properly at higher intensities or slightly higher energies.
Collimation, monitors and beam dump have, of course, to work up to the design level. The collimation needs to surpass the performance at 7 TeV even further, to make a reasonable beam-on time possible.
In the 14 TeV case a new layout of the energy extraction system is required. This seems possible, if the magnet design keeps these boundary conditions in mind.
